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Abstract
Global Health Security Index (GHSI) and Joint External Evaluation (JEE) are two well-known
health security and related capability indices. We hypothesised that countries with higher
GHSI or JEE scores would have detected their first COVID-19 case earlier, and would experi-
ence lower mortality outcome compared to countries with lower scores. We evaluated the
effectiveness of GHSI and JEE in predicting countries’ COVID-19 detection response times
and mortality outcome (deaths/million). We used two different outcomes for the evaluation:
(i) detection response time, the duration of time to the first confirmed case detection (from
31st December 2019 to 20th February 2020 when every country’s first case was linked to travel
from China) and (ii) mortality outcome (deaths/million) until 11th March and 1st July 2020,
respectively. We interpreted the detection response time alongside previously published rela-
tive risk of the importation of COVID-19 cases from China. We performed multiple linear
regression and negative binomial regression analysis to evaluate how these indices predicted
the actual outcome. The two indices, GHSI and JEE were strongly correlated (r = 0.82), indi-
cating a good agreement between them. However, both GHSI (r = 0.31) and JEE (r = 0.37) had
a poor correlation with countries’ COVID-19–related mortality outcome. Higher risk of
importation of COVID-19 from China for a given country was negatively correlated with
the time taken to detect the first case in that country (adjusted R2 = 0.63–0.66), while the
GHSI and JEE had minimal predictive value. In the negative binomial regression model,
countries’ mortality outcome was strongly predicted by the percentage of the population
aged 65 and above (incidence rate ratio (IRR): 1.10 (95% confidence interval (CI): 1.01–
1.21) while overall GHSI score (IRR: 1.01 (95% CI: 0.98–1.01)) and JEE (IRR: 0.99 (95%
CI: 0.96–1.02)) were not significant predictors. GHSI and JEE had lower predictive value
for detection response time and mortality outcome due to COVID-19. We suggest introduc-
tion of a population healthiness parameter, to address demographic and comorbidity vulner-
abilities, and reappraisal of the ranking system and methods used to obtain the index based on
experience gained from this pandemic.
Introduction
On 31st December 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) China country office was
informed about a series of pneumonia cases with unknown aetiology in Wuhan city, Hubei
Province [1]. By 15th July 2020, the disease, COVID-19, caused by infection with
SARS-CoV-2 had infected 13 150 645 people and resulted in 574 464 deaths (4.4% reported
case fatality ratio), affecting >200 countries/territories across the world [2]. Published mathem-
atical models identified a number of countries in Asia, North America, Europe and Oceania
with a higher risk of importation of the SARS-CoV-2 via infected people arriving from China
[3–6]. On 22nd February 2020, Lebanon and Israel reported their first COVID-19 cases. No
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epidemiological link to China could be established through con-
tact tracing, which suggested a link to an ongoing outbreak in
Iran [7]. Before these reports, every country’s first case had a his-
tory of travel to China.
The WHO declared COVID-19 as a pandemic on 11th March
2020 [2]. Earlier, the WHO had characterised COVID-19 as a
Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 30th
January 2020, their greatest concern being the potential for the
virus to spread to countries with weaker health systems [2].
Thus, it was important to know how countries with different
degrees of preparedness were responding to the pandemic, to
inform epidemiological risk, and how resources could be best
deployed and control measures applied in support of this global
health emergency. Some countries were at a higher risk of
importation of COVID-19 cases because of a higher volume of
air passengers and travellers from China and understanding
those countries’ responses to this pandemic is also important
[3, 4, 6]. These questions remain valid during all phases of the
pandemic and especially during the process of removal of
lockdown measures and opening of air bridges, when once
again, risks of further spread increase. This is critical knowledge
for what remains essentially a globally susceptible population,
with few countries reporting immunity levels above an average
of 5% in the community [8].
The Global Health Security Index (GHSI) is a comprehensive
assessment and benchmarking of health security and related cap-
abilities of 195 countries that make up the States Parties to the
International Health Regulations. The GHSI is a project of the
Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Johns Hopkins Center for
Health Security, and was developed jointly with The Economist
Intelligence Unit [9]. The GHSI provides an index of prepared-
ness based on the capacity gaps of countries in their potential
response to a pandemic, such as COVID-19, which most coun-
tries are ill-positioned to combat [9, 10]. The GHSI comprises
six categories, 34 indicators and 85 sub-indicators based on 140
questions. Category 2 is the early detection and reporting of epi-
demics of potential international concern. We chose this category
as our measure of the countries’ reporting abilities. We further
considered the risk of importation of COVID-19 from China to
different countries based on air-flight passenger data [4]. Since
most of the case reports prior to 20th February 2020 were linked
to cases imported from China, we considered this approach a rea-
sonable estimate of the relative risk of importing new cases into a
given country. We also compared overall GHSI to mortality due
to COVID-19 in the country (deaths per million), referred to as
the mortality outcome hereinafter. The mean overall GHSI
score is 40.2 out of 100. The high-income countries have an aver-
age score of 51.9 [9].
The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) is a voluntary, externally
validated, collaborative assessment of 19 technical areas required
to validate countries’ capacities to prevent, detect and rapidly
respond to public health risks [11]. Unlike the GHSI which is
an academic tool developed to allow inter-country comparisons
on pandemic preparedness, the JEE is a formal component of
the WHO IHR Monitoring and Evaluation Framework which
all UN member states are committed to implementing. The JEE
is not designed for making inter-country comparisons but instead
is a tool created to support WHO member countries in establish-
ing a quantitative baseline assessment of IHR core capacities from
which they can then measure their own progress over time. While
the intention of JEE scoring has never been to draw inter-country
comparisons, these have nonetheless occurred as politicians and
national governments seek to assess their preparedness capacities
against those of their neighbours or regional rivals. Ninety-six
countries participated in the JEE scoring exercise and in this
paper we use ReadyScore, which is the average of 19 technical
areas included in JEE, as presented by Shahpar et al. [12]. This
ReadyScore is calculated using either JEE 1.0 or JEE 2.0, depend-
ing on which assessment the country completed.
The objective of this study was to quantify and compare differ-
ent countries’ detection response times and mortality outcomes
within specific dates, as related to the COVID-19 epidemic.
Specifically, we evaluated the effectiveness of GHSI and JEE in
predicting countries’ COVID-19 detection response times as of
20th February 2020, and mortality outcomes as of 11th March
and 1st July 2020, respectively.
Methods
The Global Health Security Index (GHSI) and Joint External
Evaluation (JEE)
We used the mean value of GHSI Category 2 [9] – ‘early detection
and reporting of epidemic of potential international concern’ – as
an indicator of each country’s preparedness for an epidemic/pan-
demic to evaluate a country’s response to COVID-19. The coun-
tries are ranked between 0 and 100 (where 100 is fully prepared
and 0 is not prepared at all). The countries with a score of 66.7
and above are categorised as ‘most prepared (MsP)’, 33.4–66.6
as ‘more prepared (MrP)’ and 0–33.3 as ‘least prepared (LeP)’
[9]. The mean overall GHSI score is 40.2 out of 100 and the
USA lead the rank with 83.5 points. The high-income countries
have an average score of 51.9. We also used JEE’s ReadyScore to
evaluate countries’ responses to COVID-19 pandemic [12]. The
score ranged from 0 to 100 and categorised as (i) Better
Prepared (80–100), (ii) Work to do (40–79) and (iii) Not ready
(0–39) [13]. The mean value of ReadyScore is 54.00 and
Canada leads the ranking with an score of 93.00 [12, 13]. The
details of these indicators are presented in the Supplementary
material (Tables S1–S3). We used these overall GHSI scores to
evaluate each country’s preparedness and response to the pan-
demic and specifically to test associations using the detection
response time and the related outcome, the deaths per million
(death outcome at two different time points).
Risk of COVID-19 importation
Haider et al. described the relative risk of importing COVID-19
cases from four major cities of China (Wuhan, Beijing,
Shanghai and Guangzhou) to 168 countries and territories by
considering the simulated air flight passenger data between 1st
and 31st January 2020 [4]. The risk incorporated the probability
of passengers being infected based on the outbreak sizes in the
departure cities. Countries were grouped into four quartiles
(Q1–Q4) based on the risk value (43 countries in the top quartile
(Q4), 42 countries in the third quartile (Q3), 41 countries in the
second quartile (Q2) and 42 countries in the bottom quartile
(Q1), representing the lowest risk. We used this as a risk index
of COVID-19 importation since it represented a proxy for the vol-
ume of travel of infected passengers from China into those coun-
tries and territories. Thus, countries with fewer passengers
arriving from China had a lower risk of importation of
COVID-19 cases.
2 Najmul Haider et al.
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We collected COVID-19 case and date of first report from
WHO’s daily situation updates until 20th February [14] as, during
that period, most of the case reports outside of China were linked
to the cases imported from China. On 22nd February, the WHO
reported confirmed cases in Lebanon and Israel, both ultimately
linked to Iran [7, 14]. The time lag between sampling a suspected
case and reporting it at a country level has been reported to be up
to 24–72 h [15]. Restricting our analysis until 20th February 2020
allowed us to investigate the cases linked to importation from
China and enabled us to use the importation risk index based
on the countries’ air transportation links with China alone, as
described above. Furthermore, we collected COVID-19 cases
and death data from first reports until 11th March 2020 when
WHO characterised COVID-19 as a pandemic and until 1st
July 2020 from Worldometer [16].
Statistical analysis
We collected further data mostly from United Nation’s sources
including country’s population density [17], the percentage of
the population aged 65 and above [18], human development
index [19], gross domestic product (GDP) [20] and worldwide
governance indicators (WGIs) [21].
For each of the preparedness categories, summary statistics are
presented for the median [range] of the number of people infected
with SARS-CoV-2 in the corresponding countries, and median
[range] of the times from the beginning of the epidemic in
China until detecting the corresponding first cases.
Kaplan–Meier curves were used to illustrate the time to first
case detection from 31st December 2019. Countries without any
case detected until 20th February 2020 were censored. Log-rank
test was used to compare the rate of detection between the
GHSI categories, and between the risk quartiles. Spearman’s cor-
relation was used to assess association between countries’
responses to the COVID-19 epidemic and the GHSI, as well as
the risk of COVID-19 importation. Multiple linear regression
analysis was utilised to assess the amount of variation in either
the time to detection of the first case that can be explained by
the GHSI and JEE score and the importation risk among coun-
tries reporting cases by 20th February 2020. Since the values of
importation risk were skewed, they were log transformed prior
to further analysis. We performed multiple linear regression ana-
lysis for mortality outcome until 11th March 2020. Since the two
indices, GHSI and JEE were strongly correlated (r = 0.82), we
added them separately in the model. Finally, we performed nega-
tive binomial regression analysis to predict the impact of GHSI
and JEE and other variables on countries’ mortality outcome
until 1st July 2020. Although negative binomial regression was
preferred, there was not enough data for the period until 11th
March 2020 to support the model and thus we ran multiple linear
regression.
We have excluded China from the pre-pandemic (20th
February 2020) analysis because we sought to evaluate countries’
surveillance systems’ effectiveness in detecting and monitoring the
evolution of a potential pandemic and China is where the first
cases were reported globally.
Results
The median [range] value of GHSI score was 40.5 [3.7–98.2]: 22
countries in this study scored higher than the median value. As of
20th February, 26 countries reported COVID-19 cases imported
from China: 13 were categorised as Most Prepared, 11 as More
Prepared and 2 as Least Prepared countries in the GHSI. With
respect to the risk of importation, 21 countries were in the top
risk quartile (Q4), 4 countries in Q3, 1 country in Q2 and none
in Q1.
Time taken to identify the first case
As of 20th February, the countries in the top importation risk quar-
tile (Q4) identified the first COVID-19 cases at median 28 [13–32]
days after 31st December 2019, earlier than the countries in Q3,
median 41 [32–51] days. Nepal was the only country in Q2
that identified its first COVID-19 case, 25 days after the start of
the epidemic in China.
The MsP countries identified the first COVID-19 cases at
median 26 [13–32] days after 31st December, earlier than
the MrP countries at 30 [24–51] days and LeP countries at
27 [15–29] days.
The correlation coefficient between the risk of COVID-19
importation and the time to first reported COVID-19 case was
−0.61, and the same coefficient between the risk of importation
and the number of cases was 0.64. The correlation coefficient
between the GHSI and the time to the first reported COVID-19
case was −0.32 (Fig. 1).
There were significant differences in the rates of first case
detection between GHSI categories and between risk quartiles.
Around 30% of countries in the highest GHSI score category
had their first case detected by the end of January 2020, while
50% of countries in the top risk quartile (Q4) had their first detec-
tion by this time (Fig. 2). Nepal was identified as an outlier in the
multiple linear regression analysis. If Nepal was excluded from the
regression, the risk of importation alone explained the majority of
the variation (P < 0.0001; adjusted R2: 0.63). However, the GHSI
score had minimum impact in both cases. The patterns remained
the same if Nepal was included in the analysis although the
amount of variation explained was lower (adjusted R2: 0.33)
(Table 1). When we used JEE’s ReadyScore instead of GHSI,
the model’s predictive power remained very similar (adjusted
R2: 0.66) with lower predictive value for JEE (Coefficient =
−0.05, P = 0.02) (Table 2).
Mortality outcome due to COVID-19 (deaths/million)
The two indices, GHSI and JEE were strongly correlated (r = 0.82)
indicating a good agreement between them. However, both GHSI
(r = 0.31) and JEE (r = 0.37) had a poor correlation with countries’
COVID-19-related mortality outcome. Among the 20 countries
with highest mortality outcome, 10 countries also had the higher
score in GHSI and five countries had higher score in JEE (mean
ReadyScore) (Table S3 in the Supplementary material). The
variables explaining the countries’ mortality outcome are pre-
sented in Tables 1 and 2. For the period until the declaration of
the pandemic (11th March 2020), the percentage of the popula-
tion aged 65 and above was weakly positively correlated
(Coefficient 0.13, P value = 0.06) but the GHSI was not a signifi-
cant predictor (Table 1). When we used JEE in the model instead
of GHSI, similar results were observed, with JEE remaining non-
significant and the percentage of the population aged 65 and
above as a significant variable (Coefficient 0.14, P value = 0.05)
(Table 2).
In the negative binomial regression model, countries’ mortality
outcome was strongly predicted by the percentage of the
Epidemiology and Infection 3
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population aged 65 and above (incidence rate ratio (IRR): 1.10
(95% confidence interval (CI): 1.01–1.21) while the overall score
of GHSI (IRR: 1.01 (95% CI: 0.98–1.01) was not a significant pre-
dictor (Table 1). When we used JEE’s ReadyScore in the model
instead of GHSI, countries’ mortality outcome were strongly pre-
dicted by the percentage of the population aged 65 and above
(IRR: 1.10 (95% CI: 1.03–1.16)), while JEE (IRR: 0.99 (95% CI:
0.996–1.02) had little impact on the prediction (Table 2).
Discussion
More than 200 countries/territories have been affected with
COVID-19 resulting more than 11 million cases and 500 000
death as of 1st July 2020 [16]. We used datasets for three import-
ant time periods of the COVID-19 pandemic, including (i) 31st
December 2019–20th February 2020 when every country’s first
COVID-19 case was linked to travel to China, (ii) 31st
December 2019–11th March 2020 when the WHO declared the
COVID-19 pandemic and (iii) 31st December 2019–1st July
2020, 6 months after the reporting of the first case in Wuhan,
China. In these three periods of this epidemic, we evaluated
two outcome variables including (i) time taken until first case
detection and (ii) mortality outcome due to COVID-19 (deaths/
million). However, in none of the models did GHSI or JEE status
predict any expected outcome with confidence.
The first 26 countries reporting SARS-COV-2 are an import-
ant subset to study in order to understand how countries
responded to this emerging disease. Until 20th February 2020,
most of the COVID-19 case importations were linked to inter-
national travel from China. Our findings suggest that countries
with a higher risk of importation of COVID-19, based on flight
connectivity [4], detected cases earlier irrespective of their pre-
paredness level, in contrast to the expectation that the higher
GHSI scoring countries ought to more rapidly detect the presence
of a novel pathogen in the population. China’s notification to
WHO and WHO’s press briefing [22] encouraged by the
Fig. 1. The Global Health Security Index (GHSI) overall score vs. the countries’ mortality outcome due to COVID-19 (deaths/million) (left) and the JEE (ReadyScore)
vs. countries’ mortality rate due to COVID-19 (right). The countries with highest score in GHSI and JEE also had higher mortality rate due to COVID-19 (US, United
States; UK, United Kingdom; NL, Netherlands; AU, Australia; CA, Canada; TH, Thailand; SE, Sweden; DK, Denmark; KR, South Korea; FI, Finland; SI, Slovenia; CH,
Switzerland; DE, Germany; ES, Spain; FR, France; NO, Norway; LV, Latvia; MY, Malaysia; BE, Belgium; PT, Portugal; SG, Singapore; JP, Japan; AE, United Arab
Emirates; AM, Armenia; NZ, New Zealand; OM, Oman; BH, Bahrain; SA, Saudi Arabia; KG, Kyrgystan; LT, Lithuania; KW, Kuwait).
Fig. 2. Kaplan–Meier curves for the time to first case detection from 31st December 2019 until 20th February 2020 stratified by (left) the risk of COVID-19 import-
ation quartiles, (right) Global Health Security Indext (GHSI) categories (score: >66.6 as ‘most prepared (MsP)’, 33.4–66.6 as ‘more prepared (MrP)’ and 0–33.3 as
‘least prepared (LeP)’).
4 Najmul Haider et al.
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‘International Health Regulation 2005’ probably helped countries
to proactively act on the risk [23, 24]. This implies that the risk of
importation can be used as a proxy to account for the time it took
COVID-19 to make an incursion into a particular country, after
which most countries detected their first cases at speeds that
were not affected by their GHSI or JEE preparedness scores.
Our study further confirms that the health preparedness indices
used either in the GHSI or JEE had low predictive value in
terms of (i) number of cases detected in the country until 20th
February 2020 when most cases were imported from China and
(ii) mortality outcome (deaths/million) until either 11th March
or 1st July 2020.
We do not know the exact dates when countries had their first
imported cases, however, we inferred the risk of importing cases
using direct and indirect air transportation links with China [4].
Data on the amount of technical assistance that the WHO and
other institutions provided to less prepared countries are not
readily available. However, our finding that countries with lower
GHSI preparedness scores had comparable first case detection
times to those that were deemed better prepared suggests that
in many lower scoring countries, there is a good uptake of rele-
vant guidelines and the local health staff are well-trained to
respond to such outbreaks [25]. Although the capability of a
country to perform large-scale testing will determine its long-
term ability to detect COVID-19 cases reliably, and rapid first
case detection is not the sole measure of success in containing
an epidemic/pandemic, the latter can be seen as a good indicator
of readiness and a more detailed investigation of the factors that
determine its effectiveness is warranted.
Early case detection and accurate reporting of cases is essential
for containing a pandemic so as to limit the spread of the disease
both locally and globally. The current spread of COVID-19 out-
side China (as of 15th July 2020) is now driven mostly by com-
munity transmission and countries with higher preparedness
scores are experiencing larger local outbreaks. For example, the
USA has an overall GHSI of 92.1 (ranked 1st) and has identified
more than 3.0 million cases as of 1st July 2020, of which the
majority are now assumed to be locally acquired [16].
SARS-CoV-2 can apparently be transmitted without symptoms
from a-/pre-symptomatic patients [26, 27] and super-spreading
events may occur [28]. Countries that fail to detect cases in a
timely manner run the risk of creating secondary outbreak foci
[27]. Iran is one such example, with higher reported numbers
of COVID-19-related deaths (n = 10 817) as of 1st July 2020.
Additionally, it appears Iran has exported COVID-19 cases to at
least 12 other countries including Bahrain, Kuwait and Lebanon
that had not reported importing cases from China or other coun-
tries by the end of February 2020 [7]. A study by Tuite et al. esti-
mated that there could be 18 300 (95% CI: 3770– 53 470) cases in
Iran as of 24th February 2020 for it to export cases to those coun-
tries [7] while only 43 cases were reported on that day in Iran [2].
All of the above highlights the importance of having accurate pan-
demic preparedness metrics that would help to direct resources to
where they are most needed in the event of another major out-
break. However, it seems that both the GHSI and JEE indicators
do not correlate well with countries’ ability to prevent or respond
effectively to an epidemic.
Our findings showed that the countries with lower prepared-
ness narrowed the gap of duration to detection of the first
COVID-19 case. The countries with lower economic capacity
especially those in South East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are
familiar with infectious disease epidemics. These countries, there-
fore, have extensive experience in early management of infectious
diseases epidemics. For example, Vietnam, a country that has
faced dengue [29] and chikungunya [30] epidemics in the last
few years, has successfully controlled the COVID-19 epidemic
in their territory and started laboratory preparedness prior to
the first case being imported and reported in the country [16].
Vietnam had not reported any deaths even after 6 months [16].
The country took early measures to test, trace, isolate and
Table 1. The linear regression and negative binomial regression models for COVID-19-related outcome and other explanatory variables including the GHSI
Duration Pre-pandemic
Date of pandemic
declaration
Post-pandemic
declaration date
Dates, until 20 February 2020 11 March 2020 1 July 2020
Outcome variables Duration of first case detection Deaths per million Deaths per million
Model Multiple linear regression Multiple linear regression Negative binomial regression
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value IRR (95% CI) P value
Risk index −2.97 <0.01 NA
GHSI −0.10 0.07 0.03 0.40 1.01 (1.02–1.09) 0.891
Total cases/million NA 0.04 <0.01 1.01 (1.01–1.02) <0.001
The percentage of the population
aged 65 and above
NA 0.13 0.06 1.10 (1.03–1.16) <0.001
WGIs NA −2.83 <0.01 1.12 (0.84–1.52) 0.023
GDP NA 0.0001 0.31 0.99 (0.99–1.00) 0.585
Population density NA 0.002 0.20 0.99 (0.98–0.99) <0.01
Adjusted R2: 0.63 Adjusted R2: 0.61 AIC: 1412
For the period until 20 February 2020, multiple linear regression was performed, and the risk of importation of COVID-19 from China had higher predictive value than GHSI. For mortality
outcome (deaths/million) until 1 July 2020, a negative binomial regression analysis was performed. The percentage of the population aged 65 and above were strongly associated with
mortality rate. The incidence rate ratio (IRR) of 1.10 of the variable ‘the percentage of the population aged 65 and above’ indicates that an increase of 1% of population above 65 years of age
increases the risk of death rate by 10%.
Epidemiology and Infection 5
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quarantine suspected people and remains the only country of
their size of population in the world without any mortality due
to COVID-19 as of 1st July 2020 [31]. Investment in health infra-
structure should reduce the risk of infection to a country and
reduces overall risk of pandemic spread [32], but if not activated
for political or other socioeconomic reasons, even well-structured
capacity is inadequate in the face of a pandemic. Collective coor-
dinated and comprehensive approaches that engage the entire
machinery of government and international organisations includ-
ing WHO should catalyse such preparedness in order to change
the trajectory of the COVID-19 pandemic. Such coordinated
efforts remain at the core of global health security.
The 10 countries worst affected with COVID-19 in terms of
deaths per million are among the top 20 countries in terms of
their overall GHSI scores. These scores are not correlated with
the times taken to detect the first case in each country.
Similarly, JEE’s ReadyScore did not correlate well with detection
of the first case in the country. For example, Vietnam ranked
50th (score: 49.1) and Sri Lanka 120th (score 33.9) within
GHSI, and both countries responded well with less than one
death per million (Vietnam reported no deaths). These rankings
do not adequately weigh or consider the importance of universal
health coverage, integration of national response services across
sub-national jurisdictions and the critical importance of effective
political leadership during times of crisis and such parameters are
likely strongly correlated with time to detection and outcome, per-
haps in part explaining the apparent paradox reported here. High
income countries with a high GHSI or JEE may rely on profes-
sionals with competing interests and institutions with varying
degrees of authority and responsibility across national and sub-
national political boundaries to deal with a health crisis rather
than taking individual and communal responsibility. Thus, the
indicators and their respective weighting used in GHSI and the
JEE might need to be radically revised in future from the lessons
learned from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Our study has several limitations. First, the COVID-19 cases
and death data reported from different countries might not be
accurate for the total number of cases and deaths due to underre-
porting and inadequate testing, although early in the epidemic
this was likely to be true in nearly all countries. There is a com-
mon case definition for COVID-19 globally [33], however, the
testing and diagnostic capacity varies, which could affect both
case and death counts. Going forward, the challenge will be to
reduce such differences in reporting cases and deaths and the
rate of detection is being improved generally. Second, the global
pandemic awareness increases as a result of greater community
engagement and this enables the governments to take the neces-
sary steps to control the pandemic including acquiring and build-
ing the necessary diagnostic capacity. Therefore, the countries
likely to import cases later than others had more time to prepare
and were on greater alert. This might have affected the case detec-
tion speed in some countries. Our study has not incorporated this
awareness factor in the model but it is unlikely to have been a
major confounder especially as poorer countries are less able to
disseminate information with lower media coverage and fewer
consumers of electronic media. Third, the magnitude of the epi-
demic in China was growing during the study period, so the abso-
lute risk of importation would have likewise grown with time for
all of the countries. However, while the size of the epidemic
increases the absolute importation risk, this would not change
the relative risk values if the transportation links remained
unchanged. On the other hand, travel bans were implemented
in a number of countries, which would have affected the risk of
importation, and which we could not address in our model.
Nevertheless, given the relatively short time under consideration,
we believe these limitations did not alter our findings
substantially.
These global health preparedness indices (GHSI and JEE) are
missing variables and inadequately weighting others that could
more accurately capture the likely response of countries in such
Table 2. The linear regression and negative binomial regression models for COVID-19-related outcome and other explanatory variables including JEE’s
ReadyScore [12, 13]
Duration Pre-pandemic
Date of pandemic
declaration
Post-pandemic
declaration date
Dates, until 20 February 2020 11 March 2020 1 July 2020
Outcome variables Duration of first case
detection
Deaths per million Deaths per million
Model Multiple linear regression Multiple linear regression Negative binomial regression
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value IRR (95% CI) P value
Risk index −2.93 <0.01 NA
JEE (ReadyScore) −0.06 0.02 −0.01 0.18 0.99 (0.98–0.99) 0.419
Total cases/million 0.04 <0.01 1. 01 (1.001–1.01) <0.001
The percentage of the population aged 65 and above NA 0.14 0.05 1.10 (1.01–1.21) 0.027
WGIs NA −2.62 <0.01 1.28 (0.82–1.96) 0.224
GDP (per capita) NA 0.0001 0.21 0.99 (0.99–1.01) 0.971
Population density NA 0.003 0.15 0.99 (0.98–0.99) <0.001
Adjusted R2: 0.66 Adjusted R2: 0.62 AIC: 619
For the period until 20 February 2020, multiple linear regression was performed and the risk of importation of COVID-19 from China had higher predictive value than JEE. For deaths per
million until 1st July 2020, a negative binomial regression analysis was performed. The percentage of the population aged 65 and above were strongly associated with mortality outcome. The
incidence rate ratio (IRR) of 1.10 of the variable ‘the percentage of the population aged 65 and above’ indicates that an increase of 1% population above 65 years of age increases the risk of
death rate by 10%.
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an emergency as COVID-19. As stated earlier, the WHO was
more concerned with the risk of the pandemic to poor countries
than rich ones at the beginning which has proven to be a very
costly mistake, and the existence of the GHSI in its present
form encouraged this position. One such missing variable could
be a measure of vulnerabilities and/or dependencies on health sys-
tems from an aged population and from co-morbidities. Data are
showing a high incidence of obesity, diabetes and cancers
amongst fatalities, and the possible role of socioeconomic and
environmental health risks from air pollution, relative poverty,
poor housing and crowding, some of which have shown to be
important drivers of the death rate due to COVID-19 in all coun-
tries [34]. The healthiness of any society including universal
access to quality assured health services is another important
measure of resilience as the ability to coordinate rapidly a societal
response to a pandemic. A measure of trust in the political system
or compliance with international health regulations may be
important parameters to include in the index, as would be a
One Health governance indicator showing potential for an inte-
grated approach to prevention and response to emerging infec-
tious diseases. This would devolve responsibility for public
health to a wider disciplinary community, increasing the poten-
tial to prevent and respond to a pandemic. It would also improve
the breadth of scientific advice to government on the one hand
while also supporting a system of improved and more account-
able governance of the actions arising from such advice on the
other.
Conclusion
The GHSI and JEE indices did not predict well countries’
COVID-19 detection times and mortality outcome over the per-
iod of the study but it will be some months or years before a
full assessment can be done. Countries with a higher risk of
importation detected their first COVID-19 cases earlier, irrespect-
ive of their preparedness status as measured by the GHSI or JEE
scores. Some limitations are inevitable in these analyses as all of
the factors determining the speed of case detections could not
be incorporated into our model. In the current COVID-19 pan-
demic emergency, countries with lower preparedness scores
appear to have narrowed the gap of the time taken to detect
first COVID-19 cases when compared to their so-called better-
prepared counterparts. Long-term investment in health infra-
structure for pandemic preparedness is essential but the true
test of its efficacy is in a real pandemic. As shown by this
study, especially early on in the pandemic of COVID-19, social
and political factors and vulnerabilities not built into the GHSI
and JEE evaluation can undermine effective action and these
need to be addressed globally. We recommend the GHSI and
JEE scoring tools be revised to include additional parameters
that better estimate countries true pandemic preparedness and
vulnerabilities, based on the lessons learned from the
COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the ongoing COVID-19 pan-
demic remains the most recent illustration of how global powers
are ill prepared to lead health crises of international concern
when their own societies are threatened, and the experience high-
lights the enduring need for greater political commitment to glo-
bal health security and for a strengthening of the multilateral
system to support a coordinated and effective response.
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